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BAKKE v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA:
THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutionality of remedial admissions programs' was initially
presented for adjudication before the United States Supreme Court in
DeFunis v. Odegaard.2 Unfortunately, since the Court determined that
the case was moot,3 the important constitutional issue was left un-
answered. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California4-a case
very similar to DeFunis5 -will provide the Supreme Court a second op-
portunity to consider this significant constitutional question. Hopefully,
the Court will reach the merits of Bakke6 and thus achieve some finality
in this area of constitutional law.
1. These programs have been variously labeled "benign discrimination," Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 328 n.2, 348 N.E.2d 537, 540 n.2, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 n.2 (1976), "reverse discrimination," id., and "preferential admissions,"
O'Neil, Perferential [sic] Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YLFn L.J. 699 (1971). However, it is this author's belief that the
most accurate description of these programs is "remedial admissions" since their im-
mediate objective is to "remedy" the effect of past racial discrimination which has
resulted in virtually complete segregation in our nation's schools.
2. 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). After Marco
DeFunis was twice denied admission to the University of Washington Law School, he
filed suit in Washington Superior Court alleging that the school's minority admissions
program violated the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at
1178. Since the law school classified and treated applicants on the basis of race, the
trial judge found the program to be unconstitutional per se. Id. On appeal however,
the Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment; the special admissions program
was held to be constitutional since it furthered the compelling state interest of expanding
educational opportunities for minorities who had been previously underrepresented in the
law schools as well as in the legal profession. Id. at 1184. However, the United States
Supreme Court declared the case technically moot because DeFunis, who had been tenta-
tively admitted pending final judicial resolution of his claim, was scheduled to complete
law school that term. 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974).
3. 416 U.S. at 319-20.
4. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, modified, 18 Cal. 3d 252b
(1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
5. The major distinguishing feature of the two cases is the type of school involved.
DeFunis sought judgment against the University of Washington Law School, 507 P.2d
at 1171-72; Bakke's suit is against the University of California at Davis, Medical
School, 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
6. In a modification of its original opinion, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), the California Supreme Court ordered that Allan Bakke be admitted
to the Davis Medical School. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal.
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Following a discussion of the facts, decision and rationale of Bakke,
this comment will demonstrate that remedial admissions programs are
constitutionally permissible under traditional equal protection analysis;
either strict scrutiny or minimal scrutiny. However, it win then assert
that such criteria are inappropriate and will posit a new approach to
solving the equal protection problems created by remedial admissions
programs.
II. Bakke-THE FACTS AND DECISION
Plaintiff Allan Bakke, a Caucasian, applied for admission to the
University of California's Medical School at Davis for the academic
years 1973 and 1974. Upon denial of the applications, Bakke brought
Suit 7 against the University seeking mandatory, injunctive, and declara-
3d 252b (1976). This factor places Bakke in a situation similar to that for which De-
Funis was declared moot. See note 2 supra.
7. A recent newspaper article revealed that an admissions officer encouraged Allan
Bakke to file suit against the Davis Medical School in order to challenge the constitu-
tionality of its special admissions program. LA. Times, Feb. 4, 1977, Pt. II, at 1, col.
5. Whether that same officer would have been able to personally challenge the consti-
tutionality of the school's admission procedure presents an intriguing question.
The starting point for analysis in this area is the distinction between "standing to sue"
and "standing to assert." Standing to sue requires the plaintiff to be "injured in fact";
a clear adversity between the parties usually indicates the existence of case or contro-
versy jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. III. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
112-14 (1976). Standing to assert, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to be a
proper proponent of the legal rights asserted in the suit. Id.
The right to assert a constitutional challenge on the ground of jus tertii, i.e., asserting
the rights of a third party, originates from a judicially imposed rule of restraint--one
may not claim standing to assert the constitutional rights of a third party. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (1953). But since the Court has created
so many exceptions to the general rule, its current validity as a hard-and-fast standard
is questionable. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Court
has singled out two factors as pertinent when seeking to establish an exception to the
general rule against raising the rights of third parties. The first factor which the Court
considers is the relationship of the litigant to the individual whose right he seeks to vin-
dicate. 428 U.S. at 114. In Singleton, the Court stated that the enjoyment of the
right must be "inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue," id.,
and that the relationship between the litigant and third party must be such that the liti-
gant is as effective a proponent of the right as the third party. Id. at 115. Most instances
in which the Court has upheld the required relationship have involved cases where a
liaison of a confidential nature was present. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (physician-patient); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (physician-
patient); cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (granting standing to an owner
of real estate to challenge a racially restrictive covenant). The second factor which
the Court assesses is the third party's ability to assert his own right. 428 U.S. at 115-16.
A genuine obstacle to such an assertion is usually required. Id. at 116.
A recent case upholding the applicability of jus tertii standing is Craig v. Boren, 429
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tory relief. His complaint alleged that his application to the medical
school would have been accepted but for the University's special admis-
sions program.' Bakke claimed this program discriminated against him
because of his race, in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 9 The Univer-
U.S. 190 (1976). Appellant Craig, a male who was at the time of the institution of
the suit between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a vendor of 3.2 percent
beer, brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that an
Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of "non-intoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to
males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 violated the equal protec-
tion rights of the males between the ages of 18-20 years. The Court held that since
only declaratory and injunctive relief were sought, the controversy was moot as to Craig
since he turned 21 after commencement of the suit. Id. at 192. However, the Court
held that the beer vendor did have jus tertii standing. She suffered "injury in fact" by
either obeying the statutory provisions and incurring economic loss or disobeying the
statute and suffering sanctions. Id. at 194. Additionally, the vendor had standing to
assert the rights of third parties since defeat of her suit and the continued enforcement
of the state statute would "'materially impair the ability of' the males 18-20 years of
age to purchase 3.2 percent beer." Id. at 196 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 446 (1972)).
In the Los Angeles Times article, the officer stated that as a result of the disclosure
of his part in the Bakke suit, he was relieved of practically all of his admissions respon-
sibilities and assigned to meaningless jobs. L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1977, Pt. II, at 1, col.
5, 6. He thus suffered "injury in fact." Furthermore, the type of injury suffered by
the officer is sufficient to invoke constitutional protection, as allegations of non-economic
injury have been sufficient to provide standing in cases brought to benefit the public.
See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denied standing to an organ-
ization because none of its members alleged any specific injury).
However, the admissions officer would only be able to satisfy one of the two factors
required to establish standing to assert. Arguably the third party, the applicant, would
be unable to assert his own rights. A barrier to the assertion of the unconstitutional-
ity of a school's admissions program is the imminent mootness of the applicant's claim.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1972).
Nevertheless the relationship between the officer and the applicant is not such that the
officer would be as effective a proponent of the right as the applicant. Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976).
Therefore, application of the jus tertii standing principle to a potential suit by an offi-
cer of a university challenging the school's admission procedure may fail as a result
of the lack of standing to assert.
8. The University allots 100 new places each year for the entering class at the Davis
Medical School. Of those 100 spaces, 16 are reserved for minority students admitted
through the school's special admissions program. The school received 2,644 applications
for the 1973 academic year and 3,737 in 1974. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
9. Bakke alleged that the special admissions program applied preferential standards
of admission to members of racial minorities resulting in the acceptance of less qualified
minority applicants. Id.
10. In the cross-complaint the University alleged that the minority status of an appli-
cant is only one factor in its overall selection process. It added that the special admis-
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sity cross-complained for declaratory relief, seeking a determination of
the validity of its special admissions program.'0
The trial court found, on the University's cross-complaint, that the
remedial admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment."
However, the court declined Bakke's request for injunctive relief upon
the determination that Bakke would not have been accepted for admis-
sion in either 1973 or 1974, even if there had been no special admis-
sions program.' 2 Both parties appealed from the judgment and
because of the importance of the issues involved, the California
Supreme Court immediately accepted the case, bypassing the court of
appeal.
13
The California Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the lower
court opinion declaring the University's special admissions program un-
constitutional.14 It framed the issue as "whether a racial classification
which is intended to assist minorities, but which also has the effect of
depriving those who are not so classified of benefits they would enjoy
but for their race, violates the constitutional rights of the majority."' 5
The court commenced its inquiry by surveying the various standards
of review utilized in the equal protection area. Rejecting the more
lenient rational basis test' 6 urged by the University, the court applied
the strict scrutiny standard.' 7  The majority reasoned: classification by
sions program was formulated to "promote diversity in the student body and the medical
profession, and to expand medical education opportunities to persons from economically
or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds." Id. at 39, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 683.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The procedure was based on CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12 and rule 20 of the
California Rules of Court. 18 Cal. 3d at 39, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
14. Id. at 64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
15. Id. at 48, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690. The court further
divided the issue into "two distinct inquiries"; (1) the appropriate test to be used in the
determination of whether the program violates the equal protection clause, and (2)
whether the program satisfies the requirements of the applicable test. Id. at 49, 553
P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
16. The court stated that the general rule of the rational basis test is that classifica-
tions instituted by government regulations are presumed valid so long as "'any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived' in their justification." Id. (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1966)). The use of the rational basis test usually means
that a reviewing court will strain to find a legitimate or permissible state purpose in
order to uphold the legislation. Id. See notes 65-73 infra and accompanying text.
17. Strict scrutiny is triggered whenever a "fundamental interest" or "suspect classifi-
cation" is involved. See notes 74-84 infra and accompanying text. When either a fun-
damental interest or a suspect classification is present, the burden shifts to the state to
establish a "compelling interest" which justifies the statutory interference. In practice,
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race traditionally has required a more stringent standard of review; it
is irrelevant that the non-minority rather than the minority is the focus
of the discrimination."8
Satisfied that the strict scrutiny standard was the applicable test, the
majority then proceeded to determine whether the University's special
admissions program met that test. The Regents' assertion that the
program was compelling on the ground that minorities would have
greater rapport with physicians of their own race was summarily re-
jected.'" The court was also not convinced that the two major goals
of the program-to integrate the student body and to improve medical
care for minorities-could not be achieved by means "less detrimental
to the rights of the majority. '20  Less burdensome alternatives were
proposed by the court: flexible admission standards, 21 aggressive re-
cruitment programs for disadvantaged students of all races,2 2 and ex-
pansion of student enrollment in medical schools.2
Finally, the cases in the employment area which granted a prefer-
ence to minorities were found to be unpersuasive.24 The majority
however, these requirements have been construed in such a way as to effectively guaran-
tee a finding of unconstitutionality once strict scrutiny is applied. Chief Justice Burger
recently stated: "So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than per-
fection." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
18. 18 Cal. 3d at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
19. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 54, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
22. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 57, 553 P.2d at 1168; 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696. The court stated:
[A]bsent a finding of past discrimination-and thus the need for remedial measures
to compensate minorities for the .prior discriminatory practices of the employer-
the federal courts, with one exception, have held that the preferential treatment
of minorities in employment is invalid on the ground that it deprives a member
of the majority of a benefit because of his race.
Id. at 57-58, 553 P.2d at 1168, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
The one exception mentioned by the court is Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1970). In Porcelli, the court of appeals approved a public school board plan which
would increase the number of black administrators by disregarding the regular promotion
schedule. The constitutional challenge made by white administrators who ranked above
the blacks and were thus denied employment as a result of board policy was rejected.
The court not only found that the school board was permitted to prefer minority appli-
cants, but indicated that the board may have had an affirmative duty to do so in order
to integrate school faculties. Id. at 1257-58.
The California Supreme Court, while admitting that Porcelli could not be harmonized
with other federal court decisions in the employment area, found its reasoning unpersua-
sive. The error, as perceived by the court, was the failure to recognize "the distinction
between a classification which grants a benefit to one race at the expense of another
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noted that the employment cases involved evidence of prior discrimina-
tory conduct while similar evidence was not offered in Bakke.
25
Justice Tobriner registered a strong dissent in Bakke emphasizing
"two fundamentally flawed premises" from which the majority pro-
ceeded.26 First, the court failed to distinguish between invidious racial
classifications and remedial or benign racial classifications.2 7  Second,
the court incorrectly asserted that the minority students who entered
under the special admissions program were "less qualified" than the
non-minority students.28
Historically, racial classifications have had the effect of stigmatizing
or according inferior treatment to minorities. 29  Justice Tobriner as-
serted, however, that the majority erred in judging the present case30
under the same standards utilized to resolve challenges of invidious
racial discrimination.31 Recent cases in the school desegregation32 and
employment areas13 have repeatedly approved of the use of racial
classifications to arrive at adequate minority representation.34 The
and one which does not have that effect." 18 Cal. 3d at 57-59 n.27, 553 P.2d at 1168-
69 n.27, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97 n.27.
25. 18 Cal. 3d at 57, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
26. Id. at 65, 553 P.2d at 1173, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 67-68, 553 P.2d at 1174-75, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
30. The racial classifications at issue in Bakke were designed to promote integration
as well as to remedy the continuing effects of historical discrimination. Id. at 68, 553
P.2d at 1175, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
31. Id. at 69, 553 P.2d at 1175, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703. No authority can be cited
for the majority's position. Id. Quoting from the United States Supreme Court decision
of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), Justice Tobriner
emphasized that the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of a program based
on racial classification to achieve school integration. Moreover, the dissent noted that
it was within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities to voluntarily institute
such a program. 18 Cal. 3d at 70, 553 P.2d at 1177, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
32. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971);
Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Wanner v. County School Bd.,
357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (lst
Cir. 1965), cited in 18 Cal. 3d at 70 n.4, 553 P.2d at 1177 n.4, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705 n.4.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lath, Int'l, Local 46, 471 F.2d
408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Local 212, 472
F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971), cited in 18 Cal. 3d at 71 n.5, 553 P.2d
at 1177 n.5, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705 n.5.
34. To counter the majority's assertion that "all. . .racially 'non-neutral' efforts are
presumptively unconstitutional," Justice Tobriner pointed to the recently decided case of
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which explicitly approved of the use of
aggressive affirmative action to recruit black police officers. 18 Cal. 3d at 72, 553 P.2d
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majority attempted to distinguish such cases on the theory that none
imposed a "detriment" on non-minorities;3 5 the dissent attacked that mis-
conception with vigor. The employment cases indicate that whenever
a certain percentage of minorities is required to be hired, there is some
displacement of non-minorities.86 In the area of education, the magnet
school concept s7 is illustrative. Since the aim of the magnet school is
to encourage integration,3 8 admission is not based solely on objective
criteria such as grades or test scores.89 Despite the fact that there is
some racial preference inherent in such a concept and that some
students may be excluded although arguably "better qualified," courts
have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of such programs. 40
Focusing on the circumstances in Bakke, Justice Tobriner declared
that implementation of a special admissions program by the University
does not require proof of its past discrimination. 41 Acceptance of such
a rule would penalize the wrong institutions.42 Furthermore, it cannot
be maintained that the Constitution would preclude voluntary integra-
tion programs.
43
Since the University adopted the special admissions program to
promote the constitutionally permissible goal of integration, Justice
Tobriner suggested that the rational basis test4 4 rather than the com-
at 1178, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 706. In fact, the Davis court relied on those affirmative ef-
forts to dispel the accusation that the police department had discriminated on the basis
of race. 426 U.S. at 246.
35. 18 Cal. 3d at 73, 553 P.2d at 1178-79, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
36. Id. See note 33 supra.
37. A magnet school is one which offers a variety of subjects and special equipment
unavailable at other schools in the district. It is often set up in a minority school as
an inducement for non-minority students to voluntarily transfer to the location. 18 Cal.
3d at 74, 553 P.2d at 1179, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
38. See note 37 supra.
39. 18 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
40. See, e.g., Hart v. Community Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 42-43, 54-55 (2d Cir.
1975).
41. 18 Cal. 3d at 76, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708. See notes 110-16 infra
and accompanying text regarding the requirement of proof of past discrimination. One
of the major difficulties in producing evidence of past discriminatory conduct by the
Davis Medical School was the fact that the "real parties in interest," the minority stu-
dents, were not represented in the suit. Understandably, counsel for the Medical School
would be reluctant to present evidence of prior racial discrimination by the school since
to do so would open it up to further suits based on that prior discriminatory conduct.
Thus, evidence to sustain a charge of past discrimination by the school was lacking.
42. 18 Cal. 3d at 76, 553 P.2d at 1181, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 80, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712. For a definition and explana-
tion of this test see notes 65-73 infra and accompanying text.
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pelling state interest test45 was a more appropriate standard of review.
He noted that prior to the institution of the program, the medical school
relied heavily on such criteria as Medical College Aptitude Test
(MCAT) scores and undergraduate grades.4 6  But this approach effec-
tively excluded almost all qualified minority applicants, resulting in a
largely segregated institution.17 In order to remedy this situation, the
medical school initiated its special admissions program. 48
Justice Tobriner emphasized, however, that the program did not
sanction the admission of unqualified minority applicants.4" Accepting
minority students with lower grade point averages (GPA) and lower
MCAT scores than non-minorities should not imply that the minority
admittees are less qualified, and therefore that the program is dis-
criminatory. 0 It is entirely reasonable for the medical school to
de-emphasize such objective criteria for numerous studies have cast
doubt on the validity of the correlation between such criteria and subse-
quent performance in medical school.5 1
The Regents listed several objectives of the special admissions
program: to promote diversity in the medical school,5 to alleviate the
45. See note 17 supra.
46. 18 Cal. 3d at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 82, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
49. Id. at 82, 553 P.2d at 1185, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 83-84, 553 P.2d at 1186, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
A plethora of studies have recently surfaced indicating little or no correlation between
scores achieved on the MCAT and subsequent performance in medical school. Id. at
84 nn.13-14, 553 P.2d at 1186-87 nn.13-14, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15, nn.13-14.
What the studies disclose, in essence, is that the value of MCAT scores as a predictor
of academic and professional success is at best uncertain and possibly nonexistent. See
Haley & Lerner, The Characteristics and Performance of Medical Students During Pre-
clinical Training, 47 J. MED. E., June, 1972 at 446, where the authors found a negative
correlation between MOAT scores and subsequent performance in medical school. In
light of such findings, the majority's reliance on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), becomes inapposite. 18 Cal. 3d at 59, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that absent a racially discriminatory
motive, a test is not invalid solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
426 U.S. at 245-46. However, at no point in Davis did plaintiffs demonstrate the com-
plete lack of correlation between the test and what it purported to measure. The studies
conducted on the MCAT have in fact shown that it is invalid when used to compare
minority and non-minority applicants. See Amicus Brief of the NAACP, Appendix B,
Table 2, Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
52. 18 Cal. 3d at 85, 553 P.2d at 1187, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 715. Quoting from Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), Justice Tobriner noted that
the United States Supreme Court had explicitly approved of programs designed to achieve
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underrepresentation of minorities in the medical profession, 53 to in-
crease adequate medical services to minority communities,"4 and to pro-
mote the greater goal of an integrated society. 55 Justice Tobriner
found all of these objectives compelling. 56  The majority, on the other
hand, suggested that these goals could be achieved just as effectively
by allowing disadvantaged students of all races to enter under the
special admissions program.>7 However, the dissent noted, the aim of
the medical school is to achieve a racially and ethnically integrated stu-
dent body, not an economically diverse one. 58 Thus, any nonracial
classification will achieve the school's objectives only to the extent that
such a classification coincides with a minority race or ethnic back-
ground.5"
In conclusion, Justice Tobriner declared that the recent implementa-
tion of "affirmative action" programs hopefully introduced the expunc-
tion of this country's heritage of racial discrimination. °' Yet, he
reflected: "It is anomalous that the Fourteenth Amendment that
served as the basis for the requirement that elementary and secondary
schools could be compelled to integrate, should now be turned around
to forbid graduate schools from voluntarily seeking that very objec-
tive."61
A major premise on which the Bakke majority and dissent disagreed
was the appropriate standard of review to be applied to remedial admis-
sions programs. While the majority declared the strict scrutiny stand-
ard applicable, Justice Tobriner selected a less rigorous test. An ex-
racial balance in the schools so that students may be prepared to live in a pluralistic
society. 18 Cal. 3d at 85, 553 P.2d at 1187, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 86, 553 P.2d at 11,87-88, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16. The serious disparities
existing between white and nonwhite infant mortality and life expectancy tables empha-
size "the need to improve the availability and quality of health care" for minorities. The
minority infant mortality rate in the United States is comparable to the infant mortality
rate in many developing nations. Reply Brief of the Regents of California at 13, Bakke
v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). Justice Tobriner observed that it was
neither "unreasonable nor improper" for the school to conclude that perhaps one of the
reasons for this deplorable situation is the shortage of minority physicians. 18 Cal. 3d
at 86, 553 P.2d at 1188, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
55. Id. at 87, 553 P.2d at 1188, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
.58. Id. at 89-90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
59. Id. at 90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
60. Id. at 91, 553 P.2d at 1191, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
61. Id. at 92, 553 P.2d at 1191, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 719,
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amination of the development of the equal protection concept should
illuminate the basis for disagreement between the two opinions.
HIL. EQUAL PROTECTION: BACKGROUND
The modem era of equal protection interpretation began in 1938
with a footnote in an opinion of Justice Stone" foreshadowing a two-tier
approach to equal protection cases. Justice Stone suggested that the
appropriate standard might vary according to the nature and impor-
tance of the interests at stake. He noted, in particular, a distinction
between "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions" 60 3 for which a relatively relaxed standard of review might be
appropriate and "statutes directed at particular religious or national
or racial minorities' which might summon a "more searching judicial
inquiry.""4
A. The Two-Tier Approach
The basic standard of review is that variously known as "traditional,"
"restrained" or "passive" review. 5  The court begins with a presump-
tion of the constitutionality of the legislation and merely requires that
the distinctions drawn by it bear some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose.66 The challenger has the burden of demonstrating
otherwise-a burden rarely met.67 Under the traditional standard of
review, the court must first be satisfied that a legitimate or permissible
state purpose exists. This is to insure that the legislation is within the
state's constitutional competence to pursue.18  While the courts have
sometimes made an elaborate inquiry into the motives of legislators,
they have more often rested content with the assertion of some conceiv-
62. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
63. Id. at 152.
64. Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
65. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065, 1077 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
66. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). See also Developments, supra note 65, at
1081.
67. Because of the heavy presumption in favor of the proponent of the legislation
under the rational relation standard, there have been only a few successful challenges.
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
68. Note, however, that under this very lax standard of review a "statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See also McDonald v. Board
of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Developments, supra note 65, at 1078.
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able legitimate purpose, even if this involved rejecting the most prob-
able purpose.0 9
Once a permissible state objective is shown, the rationality between
the classification and its purpose must be established.70 Strict rational-
ity would demand not only that the law have some reasonable basis,
but that the classification include all those similarly situated with respect
to the particular purpose, that is, that there be neither under-inclusion
nor over-inclusion. 71 In practice, however, the courts have not abided
by the above criteria. 72 The traditional standard of review has been
applied primarily in the context of challenges to economic and business
regulations, and rarely has a significant regulatory measure been found
to violate equal protection.73
The alternative approach to equal protection cases is "strict scrutiny"
which employs an "active" standard of review. 74  Strict scrutiny is
triggered whenever there is a "fundamental interest" or "suspect classi-
fication" involved. Fundamental interests have been held to include
procreation, 75 travel, 7 voting,77 and certain rights with respect to crimi-
69. Developments, supra note 65, at 1078. An example is the case of Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In Goesaert, the United States Supreme Court upheld
a Michigan statute which denied bartending licenses to all women except the wives and
daughters of male bar owners. Id. at 467. The probable purpose was to retain these
jobs for men, but the Court attributed to the legislature the conceivable but unlikely pur-
pose of avoiding social and moral problems which might occur upon having women serve
in bars, at least those women who were not tainted by their family associations in the
trade. Id. at 466.
70. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567 (1931). See also Developments, supra note
65, at 1081.
71. A law is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the measure, but also others who are not so situated.
Conversely, under-inclusion occurs when a classification does not include all those who
are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the measure. Developments, supra
note 65, at 1084, 1086. For an example of over-inclusion see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also note 84 infra.
72. Under-inclusion, in particular, has been justified by courts saying that "the legisla-
ture is free to remedy parts of a mischief or to recognize degrees of evil and strike at
the harm where it thinks it most acute." Developments, supra note 65, at 1084. See
also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
73. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). The Illinois statute struck down by the
Court required licenses from firms issuing money orders, but expressly exempted the
American Express Company.
74. Developments, supra note 65, at 1087-88. Strict scrutiny began with the opinion
of Justice Douglas in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the Court
held that a statute selectively providing for sterilization of felons could not be justified;
procreation was "one of the basic civil rights of man." id. at 541.
75. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
76. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
77. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
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nal procedure.78  Suspect classifications have embraced such categories
as race, 79 alienage, 0 and discriminatory treatment of the poor when as-
sociated with the denial of some other fundamental right."' When
either a fundamental interest or a suspect classification is involved, the
state bears the burden of establishing a "compelling interest" which
justifies the law.8 2  In practice, however, once strict scrutiny is applied
this requirement has been construed in such a way as to effectively
guarantee a finding of unconstitutionality.8 3  The only indication of
what the Supreme Court might regard as an overriding compelling in-
terest was provided in two cases which arose during the Second World
War. Notwithstanding the fact that a suspect classification was in-
volved, and that the legislation was both over- and under-inclusive, the
interests of national security were held to be paramount.8"
In a series of cases decided during the 1971-72 term, the Supreme
Court began to reject the rigidity of the two-tier standard in favor of
a more flexible approach to equal protection problems. Among the
more significant cases were Reed v. Reed"8 in which the Court invali-
dated a statute discriminating against women as estate executors without
specifying sex as a suspect class; Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company" in which the Court ruled in favor of illegitimate children who
were denied access to workmen's compensation benefits without desig-
78. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
79. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
80. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
81. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
82. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
83. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
But see Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973);
cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) in which a unanimous Court applied the
rational relation test although the classification was clearly based on a racial preference
(native Americans). Justice Blackmun explained, however, that this "long standing In-
dian preference" was not a "racial" preference but rather "an employment criterion rea-
sonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA
more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups." Id. at 553-54.
84. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). In these cases American citizens of Japanese ancestry were forced
to evacuate from the West Coast. The legislation was over-inclusive because it was
never supposed that all such citizens were disloyal and under-inclusive because no similar
restrictions were imposed on Americans of German or Italian ancestry, who were
equally subject to divided loyalties.
85. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
.86. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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nating the classification suspect; and Eisenstadt v. Baird"7 in which the
Court upheld the right of single persons to acquire contraceptives with-
out deeming that right to be fundamental. In both Reed and Eisenstadt,
the Court cited a passage from the 1920 case of Royster Guano v.
Virginia88 which stated that a classification must have a "fair and
substantial" relation to the purpose of the legislation, not merely a
"rational" relation. 89
Although the Supreme Court appeared to be moving toward a middle
ground,90 that glimmer of hope temporarily faded with San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez 1 In San Antonio, the Court
set aside a challenge to the property tax method of financing Texas
public schools, a challenge founded on discrimination against poorer
areas. The majority opinion retreated to language reminiscent of the
the two-tier approach. The argument that education is a fundamental
interest or that wealth (at least in the circumstances of this case) can
be regarded as a suspect classification was rejected, thereby rendering
strict scrutiny inappropriate. 92  After a very cursory analysis, however,
the majority concluded that the finance system bore "some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. ' 98 The significance of this
opinion for present purposes is not the validity or invalidity of the merits
but rather the method by which the Court reached its conclusion. It
appears that the Supreme Court has returned to safe and familiar ground
after a brief flurry of experimentation.94
87. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
89. Id. at 415.
90. There has been disagreement among commentators in the description of the new
approach. Professor Gunther sees the recent decisions moving towards a "means-
focused" model, under which the Court would concern itself solely with means, not with
ends, and where "[tihe yardstick for the acceptability of the means would be the pur-
poses chosen by the legislatures, not 'constitutional' interests drawn from the value per-
ceptions of the Justices." Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine of a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HIv. L. Ray. 1, 21
(1972). In contrast, others interpret the decisions moving towards a sliding-scale scru-
tiny where "as the impact of the statute becomes more detrimental to the members
of the class, the scrutiny required becomes more intense." Equal Protection in Transl-
tion: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FoRD L. Rlv. 605, 627 (1973).
91. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
92. Id. at 28.
93. Id. at 44.
94. Although a new standard of review is evolving in the equal protection area, a final
product has not emerged. Some opinions continue to apply the two-tier analysis, e.g.,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), although the Court appears to be reluctant to reaffirm
that approach by declaring more classifications suspect or more interests fundamental.
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B. Bakke Within the Two-Tier Approach
One of the principal reasons the United States Supreme Court has
held racial classifications to be suspect, and thus subject to strict
scrutiny, is that race is rarely related to a legitimate state goal.9 5 Under
strict scrutiny, a racial classification is constitutional only if the classi-
fication is necessary to serve a compelling state interest." Remedial
admissions programs in medical schools seek to achieve two interre-
lated objectives: (1) integration of the student body and (2) improve-
ment of medical care for minorities. 97  Subsumed under these broad
goals are such sub-categories as creating racial diversity in the student
body, providing role models for minority youngsters, developing aware-
ness of the medical problems of minority communities, and increasing
the number of doctors willing to serve in minority communities.
9 8
Few goals can be said to be more compelling.99
In Bakke, the California Supreme Court found a suspect classifica-
tion-race-and required Davis Medical School to justify its program
by showing a compelling interest. 100 However, unlike the classification
in Bakke, the racial classifications which the Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional have either stigmatized or accorded inferior treatment
The Court has repeatedly found classifications based on illegitimacy a violation of equal
protection. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971). Yet, the Court has never explicitly held that illegitimacy is a
suspect classification. In the recent case of Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974), the Court, in deciding the validity of Social Security legislation which discrim-
inated against illegitimate children, declined to rule on the question of the applicable
standard of review. Similarly, in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court
declined to hold that the need for housing is a fundamental interest; and, in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), it rejected a comparable
claim regarding education.
In opinions purporting to apply the rational relation test, the Court appears to scru-
tinize the merits more carefully than in prior decisions. Statutory classifications which
failed to meet that test were invalidated, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Even where such
classifications were sustained, the Court applied an enhanced standard of review. John-
son v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
95. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
96. See notes 74-84 supra and accompanying text.
97. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
98. Id. at 52, 553 P.2d at 1164-65, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
99. See note 54 supra.
100. 18 Cal. 3d at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691. See also text accom-
panying note 16 supra.
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to racial minorities.101 These cases, in other words, have involved dis-
crimination against already-victimized racial minorities.
Another characteristic of a suspect classification is that it is used to
disadvantage a minority group which has been subjected to a history
of discrimination.'0 2 Under the constitutional provision for judicial re-
view, courts generally presume that the acts of other popularly con-
trolled bodies are constitutional; 03 most groups complaining of alleged
discrimination are afforded access to responsible governmental bodies
and thus sufficient opportunity to defend themselves through the
normal political process.10 4  However, such is not the case with "dis-
crete and insular minorities"'0 5 particularly those burdened with dis-
abilities resulting from a history of discrimination. 00  When they are
subjected to inferior treatment or stigmatization, it cannot be justly as-
sumed that "the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities"''0 provides a meaningful alternative
to judicial review.
Where the purpose of a policy is to further a legitimate objective
rather than to stigmatize a minority group, the classification is subject
to the rational basis test. 0 8 Therefore it would appear that the proper
standard of review in remedial admissions programs should be the
rational basis test since the goal of the state's policy is to further integra-
tion and not to stigmatize a minority. 0 9
There is no requirement that a state or local body using a remedial
classification show that it has discriminated in the past." 0 Voluntary
measures to end de facto school segregation have been consistently up-
101. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964). See generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. Cm. L. Rav. 723 (1974).
102. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
103. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140-42 (1893).
104. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See notes 65-73 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
110. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). In
Swann, which dealt with intentional discrimination, the Court declined to consider the
question of whether de facto segregation was a constitutional violation which necessi-
tated broad remedial action. Id. at 23. The term "de facto" when used to characterize
segregation means segregation which is not sanctioned by law but which neverthe-
less exists, as opposed to de jure segregation which has the approbation of law. BLACK's
LAw DicroN~AY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
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held by both federal and state courts, even though racial classifications
are involved. For instance, in Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dis-
trict,111 the California Supreme Court ordered the desegregation of the
district schools even without a showing of prior discriminatory intent.
112
Similarly, in Tometz v. Board of Education,"3 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld state legislation which ordered local school boards to take
affirmative action to end de facto school segregation. The court
characterized the applicable test as "one of reasonableness" and noted
that a court could not presume "that the legislature acted arbitrarily and
without a reasonable basis in so directing the school boards of this
State." 14
Of course, it is easier to identify and assess the de facto segregation
of a school district than the de facto exclusion of minorities from a
medical school since most professional schools attract students from
many parts of the country, not just one geographic area. But a situation
that might discourage judicial interference with a medical school's ad-
missions policy need not prevent the medical school from revising that
policy. Without finding a constitutional violation, a court may not order
a remedy based on racial classification; however, it is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities to order such a remedy." 5
Stated differently, even if de facto segregation is not constitutionally
prohibited, the fourteenth amendment clearly contemplates and per-
mits affirmative remedial efforts to eradicate such discrimination.
Thus, if the fourteenth amendment does not require a court to order
111. 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
112. Id. at 881, 382 P.2d at 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
113. 237 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 1968).
114. Id. at 502. See also, McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Katzenbach, application of the rational basis
test to a suspect classification was sustained since the legislative purpose was found to
be remedial.
115. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The
Court held that school officials may assign minority students to a particular school in
order to ensure that the ratio of the minority student body is proportional to that of
the minority population of the district as a whole. Id.
Courts have long recognized that establishing standards for the composition of a stu-
dent body is a function primarily within the discretion of the university officials. This
discretion, which is rooted in the California Constitution, CAL. CoNST. art. IX, § 9, gives
the Regents "full powers of organization and government" over the University of Cali-
fornia. Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 255 (1934). However,
even in the absence of constitutional powers, courts have held that decisions by college
and university officials concerning the makeup of the student body are final and non-
justiciable provided they were not made arbitrarily or capriciously. See Wright v. Texas
S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
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a medical school to consider race in establishing its admission policy,
that same amendment should not be able to preclude the medical
school from doing so voluntarily. 116
While it appears that the constitutionality of remedial admissions pro-
grams may be upheld under either the strict scrutiny or the rational
basis standard of review, arguably, neither approach is appropriate.
An intermediate level of review, one which carefully weighs competing
interests, is the suggested alternative.
IV. WEIGHING OF INTERESTS: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW
STANDARD IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
The acute need for a new standard of review in equal protection
cases is clearly illustrated by the cases dealing with admissions pro-
grams. While the California Supreme Court in Bakke was correct in
reading its cited decisions to mean that race has always been considered
a suspect criterion, it failed to appreciate that all of those cases were
decided in the context of invidious discrimination against minorities."1
This is not to say that the entire group of suspect classification cases
should automatically be distinguished on the facts; but, the unique fac-
tual situation in Bakke certainly requires an initial inquiry to determine
whether the factors which have made racial classifications suspect in
the past are characteristic of remedial admissions programs. If these
factors do not exist, the Supreme Court should eschew the application
of a ritualistic approach which may actually thwart the purposes for
which it was developed.,""
116. In Bakke, the Regents argued that the special admissions program instituted by
the University was within their broad discretion based on their responsibility to select
students who will best serve the interests of the school and the medical profession. See
Brief for Appellant at 7, Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal.
3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
The Regents noted that most colleges and universities operate under some type of "pref-
erence" system. For example, special consideration may be given to certain students
who have specific talents or skills which the school deems desirable, and at many public
institutions preference is required to be given, by statute or regulation, to residents of
a state. See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
862 (1969).
117. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor (prior to Bakke) the California
Supreme Court has ever held or even implied that racial classifications designed to inte-
grate the races are to be analogized to racial discrimination directed against minorities.
Both Courts have indicated that racial classifications designed to assist minorities are
permitted. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 950-51, 479 P.2d
669, 676-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316-17, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971).
118. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). Courts must be wary of
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For this reason a weighing of interests approach presents a reason-
able and viable alternative. This approach would involve a balancing
of competing interests at the outset rather than an immediate categor-
ization followed by a search for appropriate rationales to sustain or in-
validate the legislation. The weighing of interests approach would
require a two-step process: First, the court would survey the composi-
tion of the classification to determine its relevance and necessity in
achieving the purported state goal. The actual or articulated aims em-
bodied in the proposal would be scrutinized; no longer would the court
hypothesize or superimpose its own will." 9 Second, the court would
examine the importance of the individual interest which is being bur-
dened or denied.
A. Weighing of Interests as Applied to Equal Protection
The weighing of competing interests is not new to the United States
Supreme Court; the Court has utilized this approach for over a decade.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tionS' 20 is an early example of balancing equities. He began his
analysis with language reminiscent of the strict scrutiny standard:
"Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property like those of race...
are traditionally disfavored."'' However, he then invoked the lan-
guage of the rational basis test by stating that "[t]o introduce wealth
. . . is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor."'122  But the
analysis faltered when Justice Douglas cited his earlier opinion in
Skinner v. Oklahoma12 as dispositive, for that case involved a funda-
mental interest.'
24
The more recent case of Reed v. Reed 125 also illustrates a retreat
the inappropriate application of sweeping generalities. Justice Cardozo has stated:
A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels.
Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment, a court frames a rule
which is general in form, though it has been wrought under the pressure of par-
ticular situations. Forthwith another situation is placed under the rule because it
is fitted to the words, though related faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought
the rule into existence.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
119. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
120. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper, the Court struck down the requirement of a
state poll tax imposed upon all residents over 21 years of age as a precondition for vot-
ing. The Court concluded that a state violates equal protection whenever it decrees the
wealth of the voter or payment of a fee an electoral standard. Id. at 666.
121. Id. at 668.
122. Id.
123. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
124. 383 U.S. at 670. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
125. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The unanimity of the decision and the unity of the opinion
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
from the automatic classification formerly employed by the Court. Ig-
noring the traditional standards of review, the Court weighed the
interests of the state-reduction of the workload of probate courts,
avoidance of intrafamily controversy-against the individual interests
being burdened-inability of qualified females to be appointed estate
administrators.12 Although the object of the legislation was found to
be legitimate, 127 the Court adjudged the classification established by
the statute wholly unrelated to its objective. 128  Therefore, the law was
declared unconstitutional 121 without the Court having to specify sex as
a suspect classification.
Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the rights of illegitimate
children without denominating the classification "suspect."' 30  Weber
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company'' dealt with a state statute
which prohibited illegitimate children from sharing equally with legit-
imate offspring in workmen's compensation awards. Justice Powell
enunciated the appropriate inquiry as a dual one: "What legitimate
state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental per-
sonal rights might the classification endanger?"'132 Citing cases that
applied the rational basis standard 3 3 as well as those utilizing strict
scrutiny,13 1 Justice Powell declared that a single standard of review was
applicable in all equal protection cases.' 35  Thus, in Weber, the Court
support the hypothesis that this type of analysis may be acceptable to at least a majority
of the members of the Court.
126. Id. at 75-77.
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. at 76-77.
129. Id. at 74.
130. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
131. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
132. Id. at 173. In examining the interests of the state the Court found that "the
regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed been a venerable state concern."
Id. But the classification in question bore no significant relationship to the acknowl-
edged purposes of recovery under the workmen's compensation statutes. Id.
133. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 384
U.S. 348 (1955); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
134. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. 406 U.S. at 173. Proceeding to examine the equal protection challenge in Weber
on the basis of this single standard of review, Justice Powell first questioned whether
denying workmen's compensation benefits to unacknowledged illegitimate children served
the state's aim of discouraging illicit sexual relationships. Id. It could not be seriously
contended, he asserted, that people avoid extra-marital relations because offspring of
these liaisons will be ineligible for workmen's compensation benefits in the future.
Justice Powell urged that the illegitimate offspring not be made to suffer because of
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clearly avoided the two-tier approach to equal protection adjudication
in preference of a studied analysis of competing interests. 13
Another case in the equal protection area which adopted a weighing
of interests approach is the recently decided New York Court of
Appeals case of Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center.137  As in Bakke,
the Alevy court faced the question of whether the remedial admissions
program at a state medical school violated the equal protection rights
society's disapproval of such relationships, for the equal protection clause does provide
courts with constitutional authority to invalidate legislative classifications that discrim-
inate without justfication. Id. at 176.
136. Two recent cases which illustrate the Court's withdrawal from a calcified two-
tier approach in the equal protection area are Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021
(1977), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Califano, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the gender-based distinction created by a social security survivors'
benefits provision, 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1) (D) (1970), constituted invidious discrimina-
tion. 97 S. Ct. at 1024. Under the Social Security Act, survivors' benefits based
on the earnings of a deceased husband are payable to his widow regardless of depend-
ency, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1) (1970), while such benefits based on the earnings of a
deceased wife are payable to her widower only if he was receiving at least half of his
support from her. Id. § 402(f) (1) (D).
The Court reasoned that Calijano presented an equal protection question indistin-
guishable from that presented in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 97
S. Ct. at 1025. In Weinberger, a provision of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance Benefits program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970), was found unconsti-
tutional. 420 U.S. at 638, 639. The provision denied insurance benefits to surviving
widowers with children, while authorizing the same benefits to similarly situated widows.
42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
The test employed by the Supreme Court in Califano is most significant. The Court
stated that "'[tlo withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives."' 97 S. Ct. at 1029 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976)).
The Court also engaged in a weighing of interests. Drawing upon the legislative his-
tory and inquiring into the actual purposes of the discrimination, the Court noted that
the statute was phrased in terms of dependency and not need. 97 S. Ct. at 1030.
The "only conceivable justification" for including the presumption of wives' dependency
is the unverified assumption that it would save the government time, money and effort,
and that was not sufficient to justify gender-based discrimination. Id. at 1032.
In Craig, the Court utilized the "substantially related" test to strike down an Okla-
homa statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of
21 and to females under the age of 18. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In addition, the Court
held that the objective of traffic safety could not support the conclusion that the gender-
based distinction at issue served to achieve that objective and thus constituted a violation
of equal protection. Id. at 204. See note 7 supra for a description of the factual
situation of Craig.
It seems, therefore, that at least with reference to gender-based discrimination, the
Court continues its adherence to an intermediate test coupled with a weighing of compet-
ing interests when determining the constitutionality of various legislation.
137. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
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of non-minority applicants. 138 However, the New York court reached
a conclusion directly opposite to Bakke.1
39
The Alevy court considered the appropriate standard of review to
be the threshold inquiry. Although noting that traditional equal pro-
tection analysis is two-tiered, 1 0 the court nonetheless applied an inter-
mediate standard of review, one that weighed competing interests.
The court rejected the strict scrutiny test for benign discriminations be-
cause such an application would be contrary to the beneficial as well
as historic purposes for which the fourteenth amendment was adopted
-to guarantee equality for blacks, and by logical extension, for all
minority groups.' 4' However, recognizing the detrimental effects of
remedial admissions programs on those adversely affected,142 the court
declared that such programs should be subjected to a more careful scru-
tiny than the rational basis standard traditionally demanded. There-
fore, an inquiry should be made to discover whether a "substantial"
state interest is served; the courts must be assured that the policy
furthers some "legitimate, articulated government purpose,"'1 43 although
that interest need not be "urgent, paramount or compelling."' 44  In
order to satisfy the substantial state interest requirement, the benefits
to be derived from the remedial admissions programs must outweigh
their possible detrimental effects.'
45
Finding a substantial state interest does not end the inquiry, how-
ever. Once the interest requirement is met, the opponent must show
that a less burdensome alternative is unavailable. 4  Possible alter-
natives must include reducing the size of the preference or limiting the
time span of the program. 47 In conclusion, the court acknowledged
that "in proper circumstances, reverse discrimination is constitu-
tional."1
48
A further analogy may be provided by remedial hiring practices in
the employment area. In remedial hiring programs, unlike remedial
138. Id. at 331, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
139. Id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
140. Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
141. Id. at 334-35, 348 N.E.2d at 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
142. The court noted that such programs may possibly encourage further polarization
of the races as well as perpetuate thinking in racial terms. Id. at 335, 348 N.E.2d at
545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
143. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id., 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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admissions programs, the courts operate under the guide of a legisla-
tive enactment;149 nevertheless, the basic principles are the same-to
overcome the effects of past discrimination.
Normally, before any remedial efforts are undertaken in the employ-
ment area, there must be a history of minority discrimination followed
by a finding that other available relief would be inadequate to over-
come the present effects of discrimination. 5 ' However, it is not neces-
sary to show that an employer intentionally discriminated against a
minority group; a history of de facto discrimination is sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination warranting remedial action.' 5'
Once the effects of past discrimination have been eliminated, affirma-
tive orders should terminate and the employer should no longer be
required to abide by quotas or percentage goals. 52 Nearly every court
that has ordered remedial action to be taken has recognized this; thus,
the orders have been formulated to run either for a limited period of
time' 53 or until a stated percentage or numerical goal is reached.' 54
149. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to,
2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
150. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d
1053, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). See generally Edwards &
Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1,
35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Edwards & Zaretsky].
151. Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1974).
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court suggested that
discrimination might be prima facie proven merely by comparing the numbers of those
allegedly discriminated against in the general population with representation of those
same individuals in the employer's work force. The Court wrote: "The District Court
may, for example, determine, after reasonable discovery that 'the [racial] composition
of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.'"
Id. at 805 n.19.
152. See Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 150, at 32.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
154. See, e.g., Rios v. Stearnfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Erie Hu-
man Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974).
In determining the appropriate limit or goal for remedial action programs, the courts
consider several factors. Some courts have considered the availability of qualified
minorities in the geographic area from which the employer has traditionally drawn his
employees. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1974Y. How-
ever, if the traditional job market is unreasonably small and thus excludes a potential
group of minority ehnployees, the court may prescribe a wider region from which to draw
minority applicants. The goal is typically based on the percentage of minorities in the
appropriate job market who could have been employed were it not for the prior discrim-
ination. Id.
The availability of training programs for potential job applicants is another factor con-
sidered in determining the contours of the ultimate goal. It is not always required that
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B. Weighing of Interests in Other Areas
Weighing of interests is an approach that has been utilized in
decisional law in areas other than equal protection. In the 1960's,
courts began to studiously weigh the competing interests of the state
and those of public employees and students in deciding whether proce-
dural rights such as notice and a hearing must be provided before an
employee can be dismissed for cause'" or a student expelled from a
state university.156
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Goldberg v.
Kelly 5 7 that the concept of procedural due process prohibited termina-
tion of a welfare recipient's benefits without a prior hearing. Since
qualified applicants were "entitled" to benefits under the Social
Security Act, their "right" to payment was constitutionally protected.'5 8
The Court enumerated the interests that must be assessed in determin-
ing the necessary procedural safeguards. Three factors were listed as
pertinent: (1) the importance of the interests in jeopardy; 50 (2) the
appropriateness of the suggested procedure in protecting those inter-
ests;150 and (3) the costs of requiring the procedure. 1 '
Two years later the Court noted that the due process clause requires
some deprivation of "liberty or property" before constitutional protec-
potential applicants be qualified to do the work immediately, thus it is often held suffi-
cient that the applicants be capable of learning the job in a reasonable period of time
if that is what is generally required by the company. In such instances, the courts have
ordered remedial training programs as well as remedial hiring practices. See United
States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851
(1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
155. See Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
156. E.g., Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
157. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
158. Id. at 261. In the past, requests for constitutional protection by welfare recip-
ients have been denied since the payment of public benefits was deemed to be a privilege
and thus not entitled to constitutional protection. However, this right-privilege distinc-
tion is no longer viable. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See
also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-58 (1968).
159. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
160. Id. at 267-70.
161. Id. at 266. The Court concluded that in Goldberg nearly all of the elements
of a trial-type hearing are required. Thus, welfare recipients facing termination must
be provided timely and adequate notice of the reasons for suspension of benefits; an op-
portunity to present testimony, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and the
right to be represented by retained counsel. Id. at 267-68.
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tion attaches. 6 ' Only if this requirement exists may the Goldberg
analysis be employed to determine what procedure is needed to protect
that interest. 163 Accordingly, in Board of Regents v. Roth'6 4 the Court
held that a nontenured assistant professor had no constitutionally pro-
tected interest in being rehired after his one year contract ended. 65
Weighing of interests is most often used in the first amendment area;
the Court balances individual interests against governmental interests
to reach a decision which accommodates conflicting claims. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations'66 is a recent
example. The Court considered an appeal from the Commission's
order that a local newspaper classify its help-wanted advertisements
without reference to gender. The alleged infringement upon editorial
prerogative was weighed against the Commission's interest in prevent-
ing sex discrimination. 67 Noting that the classified advertisement sec-
tion of a newspaper is essentially commercial' 6 8 and contributes little
to the marketplace of ideas, the Court upheld the order of the Commis-
sion. 16 9
162. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
163. Id. at 577-78.
164. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
165. Id. at 569. The Court explained that a mere need for, or expectation of, contin-
ued employment did not create a "property" interest. Id. at 578. A different result was
reached in the companion ease of Perry v. Sindermaun, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), however.
The Court held that a professor who had served under a succession of ten one-year con-
tracts might be able to show that he had a sufficient property interest. Id. at 603. Al-
though the state had no formal tenure system, the Court thought it possible that the Uni-
versity might have encouraged an understanding that a faculty member could remain as
long as his performance was satisfactory. Id. at 600.
A similar analysis has been applied to determine whether the individual's liberty inter-
est has been threatened. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See also
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which the Court held that a state must provide
a trial transcript to an indigent criminal defendant appealing his conviction, and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in which the Court held that the
state must provide counsel for indigent defendants when an appeal is granted as a matter
of right. In both cases the Court found that the individual's interest in life and liberty
outweighed the state's added financial burden. But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), in which the Court refused to extend the Douglas rationale to discretionary ap-
peals. This holding is consistent with the weighing of interests analysis since by the
time the defendant reaches the stage of discretionary appeal, his interest becomes out-
weighed by that of the state. The indigent has already been provided with one appeal
to further plead his case-it is not the state's duty to provide interminable appellate re-
view, particularly where such has not been granted to others as a matter of right.
166. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
167. Id. at 386.
168. Id. at 387.
169. Id. at 391.
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Another case combining protection of first amendment rights with
a systematic, critical scrutiny of asserted governmental interests is
Cohen v. California.170  Cohen was arrested and convicted under a
state statute for wearing a jacket in a courtroom corridor with the words
"Fuck the Draft" stitched on it. , The Supreme Court reversed.' 1'
Consideration and articulation of competing interests guided the
Court in its ultimate disposition of the case.1"2 Recognition of a broad
state interest in eliminating certain words from public debate would be
tantamount to acceptance of a boundless principle. Therefore, absent
a more compelling interest, the state could not ban the simple public
use of a four-letter expletive.' 73
C. Weighing of Interests as Applied to Bakke
Under the weighing of interests approach the court first scrutinizes
the nature of the classification to determine its constitutional legitimacy
in relation to the purported state goal. 74  The constitutionality of both
the classification and goal must be established. In Bakke, the classifi-
cation is based on race with the stated goal of integration. 175
The goal of integration-rapid integration-is of constitutional pro-
portions.' 76 Not only is integration a substantial state interest but it
is also a goal of highest priority as this country seeks to effectuate the
promises of the Civil War Amendments more than a century after their
adoption.1
7 7
Furthermore, society's potential benefit from rapid integration makes
it entirely appropriate and indeed necessary for race to be considered
a relevant factor.178  The immediate effect of integrating the schools
170.-403 U.S. 15 (1971).
171. Id. at 26.
172. The Court emphasized three points. First, although Cohen's language was
"vulgar" and "distasteful," it plainly conveyed an anti-draft message. Id. at 25-26. Sec-
ond, the prohibition of particular words would run "a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process." Id. at 26. Third, due to the government's inability to make prin-
cipled distinctions in matters such as taste and style, the Constitution yields to the in-
dividual in this area. Id. at 25.
173. Id. at 26.
174. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
175. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The University
stated that its special admissions program was "necessary" in order to integrate the med-
ical school and medical profession. 18 Cal. 3d at 89, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 718. Anything less would not fulfill the constitutional mandate of immediate integra-
tion. 391 U.S. at 439.
177. 18 Cal. 3d at 87, 553 P.2d at 1188, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
178. In fact, race may be the only classification which is both relevant and admin-
istratively feasible. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
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will be the interaction of persons possessing a variety of talents, life
experiences, and outlooks. 17 This will significantly enhance the edu-
cational process for all students. In addition, the presence of minority
members in medical schools will increase the profession's awareness of
the medical problems of the minority communities.8 0 Improving the
health conditions in the minority communities will benefit society as a
whole by providing a healthier and more productive citizenry.
Since the issue of past discriminatory conduct by the University was
not raised by either party, the majority declined to rule on the amici
curiae claim that the University's prior admissions program constituted
"discrimination in fact against minorities.'1'8 However, Justice To-
briner recognized the imperative need for deciding this underlying,
though unchallenged, allegation. "The fact that a governmental institu-
tion has not itself engaged in discrimination affords no reason for pre-
cluding such an institution from taking into account, through remedial
classifications, the present effects of past discrimination by other
bodies."' 8 2 As such, the racial classification utilized in Bakke involved
a reasonable attempt by the University to act in consonance with the
mandate of the fourteenth amendment: to eradicate the pernicious ef-
fects of racial segregation and discrimination.
Many lower federal and state court decisions have recognized the
urgent need of society to remedy the effects of previous racial
inequities and have thus permitted the use of remedial programs as a
means to that end. 8 3 Courts have upheld the use of racial classifications
in both the employment' 8 4 and education areas 8 5 when used to further
U. Cm. L. REV. 723 (1974): "And the fact that a. characteristic is irrelevant in almost
all legal contexts (as most characteristics are) need not imply that there is anything
wrong in seizing upon it in the rare context where it does make a difference." Id. at
731.
179. 18 Cal. 3d at 85, 553 P.2d at 1187, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
180. Id. at 86, 553 P.2d at 1187-88, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
181. Id. at 59, 533 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
182. Id. at 76, 553 P.2d at 1180-81, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
183. See notes 149-54 supra and accompanying text.
184. At least eight federal courts of appeals have either upheld or commented approv-
ingly on using race as a factor in employment hiring. United States v. Masonry Con-
tractors Ass'n, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1974); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972); and United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
185. See notes 186-87 infra and accompanying text.
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the interests of integration. In Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dis-
trict,"6 for example, the court placed an affirmative duty on the school
board to desegregate its schools, even without a showing of prior dis-
criminatory intent. The court noted that:
The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful con-
sequences of segregation require that school boards take steps, insofar
as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regard-
less of its causes.
187
School desegregation cannot be accomplished without taking the
student's race into consideration. Thus, to forbid the University to con-
sider the race of the applicant under its special admissions program
would seem to be directly contrary to Jackson and subsequent cases .'8
The second phase of the weighing of interests approach requires the
court to examine the importance of the individual interest being
burdened or denied. 18 9 Underlying the decision of the majority was
the assumption that the minority students admitted under the Davis
special admissions program were less qualified than many of the non-
minority students such as Bakke who were denied admission.1'0 The
court felt that applicants like Bakke, who ostensibly through "merit"
186. 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
187. Id. at 881, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The court recently
reaffirmed its position taken in Jackson. See NAACP v. San Bernadino City Unified
School Dist., 17 Cal. 3d 311, 551 P.2d 48, 130 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1976); Crawford v.
Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). See also Santa
Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 605, 118 Cal. Rptr.
637 (1975); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d
669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971). In these cases, race was held to be not only a permis-
sible factor in classifying students, but also a factor constitutionally required to be taken
into consideration when integrating the schools.
188. It cannot seriously be argued that the school desegregation cases differ in princi-
ple from those involving professional schools on the ground that no child in the desegre-
gation cases is ever denied an education. This is a distinction without a difference. Jus-
tice Tobriner, in his dissent in Bakke, deftly dispels this assertion with the example of
"magnet schools" where admission is not based solely on applicants with the highest "ob-
jective" criteria. 18 Cal..3d at 75, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708. Under
the magnet school concept some students are inevitably denied admission. But, as
Justice Tobriner noted:
Whenever there is a limited pool of resources from which minorities have been
disproportionately excluded, equalization of opportunity can only be accomplished
by a reallocation of such resources; those who have previously enjoyed a dis-
proportionate advantage must give up some of that advantage if those who have
historically had less are to be afforded an equitable share. This reality, however,
has not led courts to invalidate the remedial use of benign classifications.
Id.
189. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
190. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 47, 553 P.2d at 1155, 1161, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683, 689.
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had earned the "right" to attend Davis Medical School, were deprived
of that right due to the school's special admissions program. 1' 1
However, an applicant's desire to be admitted to a professional school
is not a property "right" protected by the due process clause.192 While
courts have in the past viewed the interest in an elementary and
secondary school education as "fundamental" because of its influence
on the child's development as a citizen, 19 3 the California Supreme Court
has implicitly rejected the application of the citizenship rationale to pro-
fessional schools. 19 Thus, the only "right" which Bakke possesses is
one which he shares with all other applicants-a right to be judged by
standards which do not offend the United States Constitution.'95
V. CONCLUSION
It cannot be gainsaid that remedial efforts on behalf of minorities
present a formidable issue, yet an equitable solution must be attempted
if the Supreme Court desires some finality in this area. However,
remedial admissions programs are not properly reviewed under either the
strict scrutiny or rational basis standard of the two-tier approach to
191. Id. at 62-63, 553 P.2d at 1171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
192. See the discussion of property rights at notes 162-65 supra and accompanying
text.
193. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
615-16 (1971). The second Serrano v. Priest decision, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), affirmed the holding of the first Serrano case which de-
clared education to be a fundamental interest. Id. at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 367. This holding, however, was based on the adequate and independent state
grounds of the California Constitution, id. at 762, 557 P.2d at 949, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
365, while Bakke is grounded in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683. Thus San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), would be the controlling
decision in Bakke.
194. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 17-18, 520 P.2d 10, 22,
112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 798 (1974). Nor does a mere desire to be admitted to medical
school comply with test stated in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), to determine -whether a "right" is fundamental in the con-
stitutional sense: i.e., whether it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 33-34.
195. The majority opinion in Bakke attempted to distinguish the disadvantages suf-
fered by a child who must travel some distance from his home to attend school and the
absolute denial of a professional education. 18 Cal. 3d at 47, 553 P.2d at 1161, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 689. The reality is, however, that both situations entail some harm to non-
minorities. The disappointment and adverse consequences that result from being bused
out of one's neighborhood may be as distressing as the denial of admission to a profes-
sional school. The fact that many applicants must be turned away from professional
schools merely reflects the competitive nature of professional education and is of no con-
stitutional significance. See also note 188 supra.
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equal protection-although their constitutionality may be upheld under
both. Therefore, the Court is almost compelled to employ an inter-
mediate standard of review. A proper solution will be attained if the
Court analyzes and balances the competing interests of each side.
Moreover, under such an intermediate approach, properly constructed
remedial admissions programs 96 would be upheld as constitutionally
permissible.
Olivia Jean Williams
196. Since remedial efforts involve sensitive and complex social issues the Court
should allow only those programs which present the least detrimental side effects. Also,
it should require that the goals be clearly set out and a termination date be set either
in chronological or goal-achievement terms. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center,
39 N.Y.2d 326, 337, 348 N.E.2d 537, 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 91 (1976).
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